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3
The Mixed Economy and Private
Enterprises: Hylsa and Fundidora
in the Steel Industry
The Present-day Steel Industry in Mexico and Its Development
Reorganization in the 1980s
The government’s neo-liberal economic reforms in the 1980s brought about
drastic structural changes in Mexico’s steel industry. One very important
change was the disappearance of public enterprises. In 1986 five integrated
steel companies existed in the country; two—Hylsa (Hojalata y Lámina, S.A.)
and TAMSA (Tubos de Acero de México, S.A.)—were indigenous private
enterprises, while the remaining three—AHMSA (Altos Hornos de México,
S.A.), SICARTSA (Siderúrgica Lázaro Cárdenas Las Truchas, S.A.), and
Fundidora—were public enterprises. Fundidora, which became a public en-
terprise in 1977 with an increase in capital participation by the government,
was liquidated in 1986 under the policy of integrating, liquidating, and priva-
tizing public enterprises. In 1991, AHMSA and SICARTSA went under pri-
vate management. TAMSA suffered vast deficits due to a sharp decline in
orders from its main client PEMEX, the state-run oil company, and to its
foreign debt problem. In the process of its reconstruction, Siderca of Argen-
tina, TAMSA’s minor shareholder, raised its participation significantly (El
Norte, June 22, 1994). Hylsa, along with its parent company Alfa, was also
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deeply in debt in the early 1980s because of its deteriorating foreign debts.
By the end of the 1980s, however, Hylsa was back on the track of growth
after solving its debt problem and carrying out a series of streamlining mea-
sures (Hoshino 1993b). Under the government’s privatization program, Alfa
made a successful bid for three of AHMSA’s subsidiaries (Rogozinski 1993,
p. 196). Of the five steelmakers, Hylsa carried out its restructuring the most
smoothly.
To understand how the coexistence of public and private enterprises came
about in the steel industry, we have to look at how the industry developed up
to the early 1980s, which I would like to summarize briefly below.
Establishment and Development of Fundidora: 1900–1940
The modern history of Mexico’s steel industry began with the establish-
ment of Fundidora in Monterrey in 1900. Leading entrepreneurs of the time
took part in its establishment. Isaac Garza and Francisco G. Sada, founders
of Cuauhtémoc, were on the list of first directors (Vizcaya Canales 1971, p.
78). The incorporation was registered in Monterrey and the factory was also
located there. However, in 1907 the company’s head office was transferred
to Mexico City where it was more convenient to raise funds and negotiate
with the government. Another reason was that Adolfo Prieto, who was the
managing director in 1907, lived in the capital. At that time Fundidora mainly
manufactured non-flat steel products, such as rails for railroads and steel
structures for oil field development. A major government policy in the pe-
riod was protective duties, and high duties were imposed on imported rails.
This policy is said to have been the result of lobbying by Prieto. Fundidora’s
production plunged following the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in
1910. Operation of the blast furnace was suspended between 1914 and 1916
because of the revolution, preventing Fundidora from benefiting from the
demand created by World War I and dealing the steelmaker a heavy blow
(Gómez 1995, pp. 12, 15, 35). After the war steel production gradually re-
covered and returned to the pre-revolution level in the late 1920s.
Five Steelmakers and Import Substitution Industrialization: 1941–82
Starting in the 1940s, four new producers, AHMSA, Hylsa, TAMSA, and
SICARTSA, entered the steel industry as integrated steel companies. AHMSA
was set up in 1941 in Coahuila and began production in 1944. Originally the
company was to be set up by entrepreneurs to meet the growing demand of
World War II and deal with the suspension of steel imports during the war.
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The government took part in the fund-raising and procurement of materials
for the company’s establishment. The governmental development bank,
NAFIN (Nacional Financiera), owned all of the preferred stocks, equivalent
to one-fourth of the capital, while 90 per cent of the common stocks were
acquired by private entrepreneurs and the remaining 10 per cent by an Ameri-
can firm in exchange for construction of a rolling mill and technical assis-
tance. NAFIN then raised its equity share to 50 per cent and assisted AHMSA
through intermediation with the Export-Import Bank of the United States for
loans, the underwriting of corporate bonds, and financing. With the start of
AHMSA’s operation, production of flat products, such as steel plates, sheets,
and tin plates, was launched for the first time in Mexico (Cole 1967, pp. 11–
12, 15, 25).
Hylsa was set up in 1942 as a subsidiary of Cuauhtémoc. At that time
imports of steel sheets for bottle caps were suspended due to World War II.
The establishment of Hylsa was intended to make up for the suspension
(Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990, pp. 49, 60). As a semi-integrated steel pro-
ducer, Hylsa imported scrap steel as raw material, but was troubled by the
fluctuation in scrap steel prices. To cope with this, Hylsa worked on the di-
rect reduction method which at the time only existed as a theory. In 1955 it
succeeded in putting the method into operation. In 1957 it set up a subsid-
iary, Fierros Esponja, to undertake sponge iron production and became an
integrated steel producer (Peart Pérez and others 1983, pp. 69, 73).
TAMSA was founded as a nonintegrated steel producer of seamless pipes
in Veracruz in 1952 and began operation in 1954. Its main customer was
PEMEX, which depended on imports for seamless pipes. The company’s
establishment was promoted by a group of entrepreneurs headed by Bruno
Pagliai, an Italian immigrant, and former president Miguel Alemán (in office
between 1946 and 1952), who hailed from Veracruz. They contributed a
majority of the capital while Italian companies in charge of designing and
construction became minority shareholders. NAFIN also paid in 20 per cent
of the capital (Cole 1967, pp. 19–20; Fragoso and others 1979, p. 182). In
1959 TAMSA became a semi-integrated steel producer with an electric fur-
nace. Because of the difficulty of importing scrap steel in the 1960s, it intro-
duced Hylsa’s direct reduction method and began the production of sponge
iron. TAMSA then joined the ranks of the integrated steel producers (Peart
Pérez and others 1983, pp. 69, 75, 81).
SICARTSA was set up in Michoacán in the 1970s as an integrated steel
producer. Michoacán is the native state of former President Lázaro Cárdenas
(in office between 1934 and 1940) who was famous for his nationalistic poli-
cies, including the nationalization of oil production. A plan had long been in
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the making to build a coastal ironworks to promote regional development.
The plan was carried out by the nationalistic Luis Echeverría administration
(1970–76) and the following José López Portillo administration (1976–82).
Initially production capacity was to be expanded in four phases by 1994. The
expansion stopped during the second phase when Mexico was hit by a seri-
ous economic crisis triggered by its foreign debt problem in 1982 (Nakaoka
1991, p. 73). The first phase called for the construction of a blast furnace, an
LD converter, a continuous casting unit, and a rolling mill, and the manu-
facturing of non-flat products was started in 1976. The second phase con-
sisted of a direct reduction plant for production of sponge iron, an electric
furnace, and a continuous casting unit. Semi-finished products for the pro-
duction of steel plates began to be manufactured in 1988 (JETRO, Machin-
ery and Technology Department 1993, pp. 74–76).
The Steel Industry Promotion Policy during Import Substitution Indus-
trialization
Starting from the 1940s as part of import substitution industrialization poli-
cies, the government promoted the steel industry by establishing public en-
terprises, controlling imports, and providing financial assistance. As men-
tioned earlier, AHMSA and SICARTSA were set up as public enterprises.
Also, Fundidora became a public enterprise in 1977, when NAFIN acquired
a majority of its stocks (a development that will be explained later).
Under Mexico’s policy of import substitution industrialization, imports
were controlled through the regulation of prices and volume. Duties were
imposed on imports to control prices, and tariffs differed according to goods.
In principle it was low for intermediate and capital goods, middle for con-
sumer goods, and high for luxury goods (Izquierdo 1964, p. 254). The tariff
on steel products, regarded as intermediate goods, though lower than those
on consumer and luxury goods, was high enough to give Mexican-produced
steel products a competitive edge in the domestic market (Cole 1967, pp.
30–35). An import licensing system worked to control the volume of im-
ports. Prior to the introduction of the system in 1944 (Izquierdo 1964, p.
263), rails, steel sheets, and wire rods were already subject to import licens-
ing since 1942. Other steel products covered by import licensing were tin
plates and steel rods (from 1945), steel plates (from 1948), and pipes (from
1951) (Cole 1967, pp. 28–29). By the end of the 1960s, almost all steel prod-
ucts were subject to import licensing (ILAFA 1971, p. 223).
An important role in financial assistance was played by NAFIN. From the
start of the 1940s, NAFIN provided funds to the steel industry in various
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forms—loans, underwriting stocks and corporate bonds, and guaranteeing
and endorsing obligation. The amount of funds increased sharply in the 1970s.
NAFIN also served as an intermediary for loans from overseas public finan-
cial institutions, including the Export-Import Bank of the United States. The
amount of funds channeled through NAFIN rose substantially in the 1960s
(Hoshino 1998, pp. 77–78). Funds went mainly to AHMSA in which NAFIN
had invested. Also working as financial assistance to companies was the
maximum price system under the “Law Stipulating the Authority of the Gov-
ernment concerning Economic Problems” enacted in 1950 (Cole 1967, pp.
36–37). The maximum price was set at a level to ensure the profitability of
public enterprises with high manufacturing costs, specifically AHMSA, serv-
ing to produce high revenues for companies with low manufacturing costs
(Wallace 1980, p. 80).
Sharp Rise in Iron and Steel Production and Market Expansion
Steel production grew smoothly during the import substitution industrial-
ization period. In 1954 Fundidora, the oldest iron and steel producer in Mexico,
was outstripped by a newcomer, AHMSA, in the output of pig iron (Hoshino
1998, p. 80). From the 1960s steel production leaped as did the production of
pig and sponge iron (Figure 3-1).
Changes in the volume of steel production by company, shown in Figure
3-2, indicate that (1) from 1955 AHMSA ranked first, (2) Hylsa overtook
Fundidora in the 1960s and retained the No. 2 position, while TAMSA, a
latecoming maker of sponge iron, lagged far behind Hylsa, (3) every
steelmaker boosted production sizably between 1962 and 1970 which was a
period of rapid growth for the steel industry, and (4) the situation differed
from company to company between 1974 and 1983: SICARTSA and Hylsa
increased their production while Fundidora suffered a setback. A huge rise in
steel production and in pig and sponge iron in the latter half of the 1970s was
attributed to the first two steel producers. The production of finished non-flat
products and flat products displayed outstanding growth from the 1960s on.
This was due to the diversification of products. Fundidora, which initially
produced non-flat products, began to manufacture flat products, while
AHMSA and Hylsa, which produced flat products, started to make non-flat
products.
The increasing production raised the ratio of output to nominal consump-
tion for non-flat products from 60 per cent in 1953 to 68 per cent in 1955, 78
per cent in 1960, 83 per cent in 1964, and 92 per cent in 1968. The ratio for
flat products also rose for the same years from 73 per cent to 84 per cent, 94
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Fig. 3-1.  Trend of Pig Iron and Sponge Iron Production, 1940–94
Sources: Peart Pérez and others (1983, pp. 71, 114); Cole (1967, pp. 6, 16,
18); Toda (1970, p. 62); ILAFA (1971, p. 7); CANACERO (1993, p. 6;
1995, p. 8); INEGI (1987, p. 43).
Fig. 3-2.  Trend of Crude Steel Production by Enterprise, 1940–94
Sources: Ávila Juárez (1994, p. 218); NAFIN (1986, p. 176); CANACERO
(1993, p. 9; 1995, p.11); Cole (1967, pp. 16, 18–19); Toda (1970, p. 70).
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per cent, 106 per cent, and 106 per cent respectively (ILAFA 1971, pp. 142,
147). This showed that import substitution industrialization developed
smoothly during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, however, imports rose
again due to a sharp growth in demand, in spite of an increase in domestic
production. Particularly notable was a rise in imports of flat products (Hoshino
1998, p. 82).
In the 1960s the largest market for non-flat products was the construction
industry (especially for reinforcing bars, heavy gauge steel, and light gauge
steel), and the second largest was the manufacturing industry (particularly
for wire rods). The chief market for flat products was the manufacturing
industry—sheets for household electric appliances, steel furniture, contain-
ers, and automobiles, and tin plates for food, pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
and beverages. A major customer for seamless pipes was PEMEX, and welded
pipes were purchased by PEMEX and the construction industry, particularly
companies engaged in public works projects (ILAFA 1971, pp. 117–20, 137,
139). By the 1960s markets for steel products had extended to a variety of
sectors reflecting Mexico’s progress in industrialization and urbanization. In
the next section we will look at the development of Mexico’s steel industry
through an examination of two steelmakers.
The Development of Hylsa and Fundidora
Expansion and Modernization of Production Facilities
World War II led to the establishment of Hylsa. During the war the United
States designated steel sheets, which Cuauhtémoc imported for making bottle
caps, as a commodity under wartime controls, and exports were banned. For
Cuauhtémoc maintaining bottle cap production was vitally important because
a suspension would affect its raw material sections as well as the beer depart-
ment. Cuauhtémoc sounded out U.S. steelmakers about undertaking local
production, but this was rejected, so the company decided to manufacture
steel sheets on its own. It purchased partially scrapped hot and cold strip
mills and plating carriers in the United States, and had its own mechanics
assemble them. An electric furnace was soon introduced, rolling was started
in 1943, and steel production in 1944. But the quality of production was
extremely poor because of the old facilities and Cuauhtémoc’s limited expe-
rience (Mendirichaga 1978, pp. 34–72).
In 1953 a Steckel mill was introduced for semi-automatic process of heat-
ing and rolling which improved production capacity and quality. An entry
into the upstream sector was studied to overcome difficulties purchasing im-
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ported scrap iron and customer demand for higher quality. The development
of the direct reduction method was chosen in place of a blast furnace because
the latter was too large for the steel production capacity that Hylsa possessed.
In 1951 experimental production got under way, and a sponge iron manufac-
turing method (HYL method) using natural gas as fuel was developed. In
1957 Hylsa was awarded a patent, and a subsidiary, Fierros Esponja, was set
up the same year to start operation of its first sponge iron production plant
(Mendirichaga 1978, pp. 62–63, 92-120). In 1960 a second plant was built
(Cole 1967, p. 19).
During the 1960s Hylsa diversified its lineup of products. In 1963 it ac-
quired Aceros de México, a nonintegrated steel producer of non-flat prod-
ucts in Monterrey. Then it set up a subsidiary, Hylsa de México, to produce
non-flat products in Puebla which is close to Mexico City, the nation’s larg-
est market for steel products. More production facilities were built in 1969
including a sponge iron production plant, two continuous casting units, and a
high-speed wire rod rolling mill. At the same time, modernization of flat
product manufacturing facilities was carried out in Monterrey. A continuous
hot strip mill, partially computer-controlled, was installed and put into op-
eration by the end of the 1960s (Mendirichaga 1978, pp. 130–56). A sponge
iron production plant was constructed in Monterrey in 1974 and another in
Puebla in 1977 (Peart Pérez and others 1983, p. 104).
As of 1940 Fundidora was equipped with a blast furnace, four open-hearth
furnaces, a converter, an ingot casting unit, and three non-flat product rolling
mills (for rails and structural shapes) (Ávila Juárez 1994, pp. 74, 79–80).
Starting in the 1940s, the steelmaker actively promoted expansion and mod-
ernization of production equipment. During the first half of the 1940s, iron
production capacity was boosted. A second blast furnace was constructed in
1942 and put into operation the following year (Cole 1967, p. 8). With grow-
ing iron production capacity, the steel production section was also expanded.
In 1942 a fifth open-hearth furnace was built, while a second converter was
constructed around the same time. Production capacity of the second and
third open-hearth furnaces was boosted. Although production capacity was
raised, output leveled off due to labor disputes. As part of small-scale im-
provement efforts, one of the non-flat product rolling mills was replaced to
produce skelp (semi-finished products for welded pipes) and wire rods (Ávila
Juárez 1994, pp. 75–76, 84, 90).
The latter half of the 1950s saw an increase in steel production capacity
and rolling capacity. From 1956 to 1959 the second steel production section
was set up, and two new open-hearth furnaces were built to double steel
production capacity. In the rolling section, production of flat products and
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pipes got under way. The diversification of steel products was in response to
a surplus of steel resulting from expanding steel production capacity, sus-
pension of rail production because of a steep rise in rail imports coming into
Mexico as part of official economic aid from developed countries, and an
expected growth of demand for flat products.
In 1956 the ingot casting unit was replaced to produce such semi-finished
products as slabs and billets in addition to conventional blooms. Established
in the same year was a subsidiary, Aceros Planos, equipped with a steel plate
rolling mill, a continuous hot strip mill, and a cold strip mill. It used slabs
produced by the new ingot casting unit to manufacture steel plates and sheets.
Fundidora also acquired a 50 per cent stake in a steel pipe maker, Tuberia
Nacional, which used skelp manufactured by the rolling section to produce
welded pipes 0.5–3 inches in diameter. In 1960 it obtained a 70 per cent stake
in Tubos de Acero, which produced welded pipes 4–24 inches in diameter
for PEMEX (Ávila Juárez 1994, pp. 97, 104–5, 110, 114, 119, 122).
During the latter half of the 1960s Fundidora further increased its iron and
steel production capacity. In 1965 it began construction work on a third blast
furnace, and inaugural kindling was conducted in 1968. The company then
closed down its first blast furnace. In the steel production section, construc-
tion of two open-hearth furnaces was begun in 1964, and both were put into
operation in 1967 (Ávila Juárez 1994, pp. 122, 135–36). In the 1970s a basic
oxygen furnace was installed in the steel production section, and a pellet
plant was constructed (Zapata 1989, pp. 84–85, 120).
Thus, both Hylsa and Fundidora pushed ahead with the expansion and
modernization of production equipment. In the next section the facilities of
three steelmakers will be compared.
AHMSA, Hylsa, and Fundidora: A Comparison of Production Equip-
ment and Profitability
First a comparison will be made of the production equipment operated by
AHMSA and Fundidora, both which are steelmakers equipped with blast
furnaces. We will compare the size of blast furnaces, the changeover from
open-hearth furnaces to basic oxygen furnaces, and the size of basic oxygen
furnaces.
As of 1979, AHMSA was operating two mills, one in operation since its
founding and a second one put into operation in 1976. The first mill con-
sisted of four blast furnaces with an annual production capacity of 1.8 mil-
lion tons, while the second had one blast furnace with a capacity of 1.5 mil-
lion tons. As of the same year, Fundidora was operating two blast furnaces
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with an annual production capacity of 1.4 million tons. In iron production
capacity, AHMSA far exceeded Fundidora, and AHMSA’s second mill was
equipped with a large-scale furnace.
In steel production, AHMSA installed a basic oxygen furnace in 1971 and
Fundidora in 1977. In 1979 AHMSA had eight open-hearth furnaces and two
basic oxygen furnaces in its first mill, and one basic oxygen furnace in its
second. In the same year, Fundidora had eight open-hearth furnaces and two
basic oxygen furnaces. The combined annual production capacity of the two
basic oxygen furnaces at AHMSA’s first mill was 1.25 million tons, and the
basic oxygen furnace at the second mill was capable of producing 820,000
tons. At the same time, the combined capacity of Fundidora’s two furnaces
was 1.5 million tons. Thus, AHMSA was ahead of Fundidora in the changeover
to basic oxygen furnaces, and the scale of the furnace at its second mill sur-
passed Fundidora’s (Kendrick and others 1984, pp. 44–46; Peart Pérez and
others 1983, p. 86; Zapata 1989, p. 85).
The next comparison is the installation of continuous casting units, an
index of ironworks modernization. Hylsa was the first of the steelmakers to
install a continuous casting unit which it did in 1969. AHMSA introduced
one in 1976 (Peart Pérez and others 1983, p. 94), but Fundidora never did. In
sum, Fundidora lagged far behind AHMSA in iron and steel production equip-
ment, while Hylsa was ahead of AHMSA in the installation of a continuous
casting unit.
Fig. 3-3.  Trend of Profit-to-Sales Ratio for Fundidora and Hylsa, 1971–80
              Sources: BMV (1977, pp. 114, 386; 1981, pp. 189, 531).
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Now a comparison of profitability between Hylsa and Fundidora in the
1970s for which data are available. Figures 3-3 and 3-4 show some indexes
from the financial statements of Hylsa and Fundidora. As the figure indi-
cates, Fundidora’s ratio of profits to sales was always below that of Hylsa.
Losses worsened especially in 1977. Low profits or losses stemmed from a
sharp increase in financial costs, including interest payments. Fundidora’s
ratio of financial costs to sales was always above that of Hylsa, showing a
rapid rise from 1975 on. Large financial costs mean large debts which trans-
lates into small stockholders’ equity. The ratio of stockholders’ equity to to-
tal assets was constantly more than 50 per cent for Hylsa, whereas the ratio
for Fundidora fluctuated greatly, plunging to nearly 30 per cent at one point.
A temporary rise in Fundidora’s ratio in 1976 resulted from a capital in-
crease. Stocks for the capital increase were underwritten by NAFIN.
Factors for the Differing Performance between Hylsa and
Fundidora
Financing for Equipment Investment
One factor causing differences between Hylsa and Fundidora is fund-rais-
ing. Publicly financed loans from NAFIN and from the Export-Import Bank
of the United States through NAFIN were mainly given to AHMSA until the
Fig. 3-4.  Trend of Financing Cost–to-Sales Ratio for Fundidora and Hylsa,
1971–80
                Source: Same as for Figure 3-3.
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end of the 1960s. In the latter half of the 1960s, NAFIN gradually increased
funding to Fundidora. Funding to Hylsa was marginal (Hoshino 1998, p. 93).
In 1942 Fundidora built a blast furnace. This was financed through a bond
flotation guaranteed by NAFIN and private financial institutions in Mexico.
The replacement of a non-flat product rolling mill in 1951 was funded by a
4.5-million dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank of the United States.
When Aceros Planos, a subsidiary for flat product rolling, was set up in 1956,
Fundidora received a 26-million dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank.
The construction of the third blast furnace in 1965 was also covered by a 28-
million dollar loan from the bank. The total amount of loans from the Ex-
port-Import Bank came to 76.3 million dollars between 1948 and 1964 (Ávila
Juárez 1994, pp. 153,162–63, 165, 182).
Investment in the establishment of Hylsa was made by major shareholders
in Cuauhtémoc (Rojas Sandoval 1995, p. 135). Until the early 1950s when
production began, Hylsa made huge investments which were financed by
Cuauhtémoc. The purchase of a Steckel mill in 1953 was funded by a capital
increase and a loan from the Export-Import Bank of the United States with
the guarantee of NAFIN (Rojas Sandoval and Rodríguez 1988, p. 62). A
German firm won the order for the construction of the Puebla plant in 1969
on condition that one-third of construction funds would come from overseas
private banks. The rest was covered by funds on hand (NAFIN 1970, p. 115).
In sum, the main financial resources for large-scale equipment investment
were the Export-Import Bank of the United States and NAFIN for Fundidora,
and funds on hand (including funds from Cuauhtémoc) and overseas finan-
cial institutions for Hylsa.
Foreign debts opened the way to state ownership of Fundidora. In the early
1970s, Fundidora carried out a capital increase and refinanced its debts through
loans from U.S. private banks as measures against its liabilities. However,
debt repayment jumped sharply because of the devaluation of the peso in
1976. NAFIN, which had underwritten 26 per cent of the stocks in the pre-
ceding capital increase, acquired a majority of shares in Fundidora in ex-
change for the taking-over of its debts (Zapata 1989, pp. 43–44).
Technological Capability
One reason why Hylsa’s revenues were so much more substantial than
Fundidora’s was the export of technology. Hylsa developed the HYL method
which it licensed to TAMSA and SICARTSA. It also obtained patents for the
HYL method in about forty countries (Mendirichaga 1978, p. 171). In the
early 1980s, the HYL method was being used at numerous steel mills over-
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seas (Peart Pérez and others 1983, p. 104). Technology exports yielded rev-
enues in foreign currencies and provided excellent opportunities for access
to information on the steel industry in foreign countries (Mendirichaga 1978,
p. 172).
Hylsa was able to develop its own technologies for several reasons. First,
it had nurtured its technological capabilities since its foundation. In its early
days, the company reassembled partially scrapped facilities, and in ensuing
years, often through failure, it accumulated experience in the development
and use of operational technologies, a process which has led to the company’s
advanced technological capabilities. Second, Hylsa has harmonious labor-
management relations. This is considered to have made it easy to transfer
technologies among employees and improve overall capability in technol-
ogy. Third, the management shows understanding about the difficulties of
technology development. It took six years to launch experimental operations
using the HYL method and apply for its patents. In a pilot plant experiment,
the steelmaker failed to put the method into operation (Mendirichaga 1978,
pp. 113–14). Experimenting was costly and it was uncertain whether it would
succeed. But it was management’s thorough understanding of the difficulties
entailed in technology development that allowed the experiments to con-
tinue. In addition, funds from Cuauhtémoc and the need to overcome the
unavailability of raw materials also kept the experimental process going un-
til the ultimate success of the HYL method.
Labor-Management Relations
Labor-management relations at Hylsa formed a striking contrast to those
at Fundidora—cooperative at Hylsa and confrontational at Fundidora.
Fundidora’s confrontational industrial relations were attributed to a pow-
erful labor union. This had an adverse effect on profitability. First, the union
frequently staged strikes except in the 1960s when the labor-management
relations were harmonious. Strikes sometimes led to the loss of business op-
portunities (Zapata 1989, pp. 37–38). Second, work functions were divided
into various categories and fixed at the request of the labor union. When
expansion and modernization of production equipment gave rise to new func-
tions, the management, which was barred from redefining functions, had no
choice but to recruit new employees or to pay extra allowances. This led to a
surplus workforce and a rise in production costs (Zapata 1989, pp. 137–39;
Ávila Juárez 1994, p. 77). Third, the labor union had a say in recruiting new
workers who were often employed through influential contacts, and this led
to a lower quality labor force (Zapata 1989, p. 125).
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By contrast, Hylsa’s management recognized the importance of coopera-
tive industrial relations. First, when the management recruited new workers,
it was careful not to hire would-be extremists (e.g., Mendirichaga 1978, pp.
66, 153). Second, Hylsa created its own welfare system for employees.
Sociedad Cuauhtémoc y Famosa was established as an exclusive organiza-
tion to provide a school, hospital, and sports, recreational, and other welfare
facilities for employees of Cuauhtémoc and its subsidiaries as well as their
families (Cervecería Cuauhtémoc 1990, pp. 44–47). Third, a sense of com-
panionship and a family atmosphere were promoted at work places (e.g.,
Mendirichaga 1978, p. 68). Cooperative labor-management relations created
in this way served to encourage loyalty to the company and willingness to
work among employees.
The cause of the contrastive industrial relations between Hylsa and
Fundidora dates back to the Cárdenas administration (in office between 1934
and 1940). The administration is noted for laying the foundation for one-
party rule by the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional). At that time, the
party was a group of political hopefuls who gained power in the Mexican
Revolution. Fierce power struggles were going on within the party. Lázaro
Cárdenas, who took office during these struggles, organized workers and
farmers as part of the PRI to strengthen his power base and stabilize his
administration. He promoted the establishment of a nationwide organization
of government-influenced labor unions. It was only in Monterrey that this
effort failed. In 1936 Cárdenas sent union activists to Vidriera Monterrey, an
affiliate of Cuauhtémoc, to organize a government-influenced labor union
(Barragán and Cerutti 1993, p. 192). To resist this, the management of Vidriera
Monterrey staged a strike by capitalists to protest and display their power. At
the same time, the management made all-out efforts to crush any govern-
ment-influenced labor union (Saragoza 1988).
In a bid to put the steel industry under government control, Cárdenas also
tried to organize a government-influenced labor union in Fundidora. He sought
to control Fundidora through a labor union because a legitimate cause for
nationalization could not be applied to Fundidora unlike foreign-owned oil
companies troubled by labor disputes. As government-influenced labor unions
extended their power, cooperative industrial relations were destroyed (Zapata
1989, p. 32). It was this bitter experience in the 1930s that led Hylsa to pro-
mote harmonious labor-management relations.
A possible reason why the management of Fundidora could not prevent a
government-influenced labor union from gaining power was its reliance on
the government, which will be explained in the following section.
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Differing Degrees of Reliance on Government
The steel producers differed in their degree of reliance on the government
for markets, financing, and labor-management relations.
The main products produced by Fundidora, particularly before diversifi-
cation of products in the 1950s, were rails and structural shapes used for
railways, the oil industry, and public works projects. This meant that the
government was one of Fundidora’s main customers. Meanwhile the largest
market for flat products manufactured by Hylsa was the manufacturing in-
dustry. Principal customers were private companies, Cuauhtémoc being the
largest in the early days. Fundidora’s dependence on the government was
larger than was Hylsa’s.
Financially Fundidora relied more on NAFIN for loans than did Hylsa. In
labor-management relations, Fundidora, which had a government-influenced
labor union, looked more to the government for intermediation. Hylsa could
carry on negotiations with its labor union without any intervention from the
government. In every aspect, the degree of reliance on the government was
higher for Fundidora.
As mentioned earlier, the managing director of Fundidora lived in Mexico
City and moved the company’s head office to the capital at an early stage.
For the smooth operation of business, it was essential to maintain good rela-
tions with the government through regular contact with government offi-
cials. As long as the government favored Fundidora, smooth operation was
ensured. If not, Fundidora faced great difficulties.
As evidenced by the Cárdenas administration, the more nationalistic re-
gimes tried hard to gain control over the key industries including steel. It was
during the Echeverría administration (1970–76) that the steel industry was
exposed to the threat of government control. As mentioned earlier, the direct
causes for the nationalization of Fundidora were its accumulated foreign debts
and the devaluation of the peso. An increase in external debts resulted from
huge losses due to labor disputes. In 1970 a road leading to an iron mine
owned by Fundidora was closed by students, suspending the supply of iron
ore for a long time. Responding sympathetically to the students, Fundidora’s
labor union carried out acts of sabotage, forcing the suspension of produc-
tion at the third blast furnace. The background to the disputes was the
government’s attempt to control Fundidora. The government apparently felt
it had to own an iron mine prior to the launch of the government-operated
SICARTSA steelworks (Zapata 1989, pp. 39–40, 52). President Echeverría
also tried to find a chance to intervene in the management of Hylsa,1 but the
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government could find no excuse for such intervention because Hylsa had
sufficient financial resources and boasted of cooperative labor-management
relations. Hylsa was more autonomous from the government, and therefore
could avoid intervention from the government.
Concluding Remarks: The Mixed Economy and Autonomy of
Enterprises
It requires huge amounts of funds to found and develop a steel industry, which
is a key sector to provide materials for expanding and diversifying indus-
tries. One of the reasons why the Mexican government intervened in steel
production through public enterprises was that such funds could not be sup-
plied by the private sector alone.
Hylsa and Fundidora dealt with financial problems in different ways. In
the initial period, Hylsa depended mainly on Cuauhtémoc for funds. As de-
mand for funds grew, its dependence on loans increased. Still, funds on hand,
including those from Cuauhtémoc, played an important role. In addition, Hylsa
had a revenue source of its own—the sale of technology.
Fundidora, which had no backer similar to Cuauhtémoc, chiefly depended
on loans from the Export-Import Bank of the United States and NAFIN for
funds. The problem was repayment, which was adversely affected by the
devaluation of the peso. Fundidora tried to expand and modernize produc-
tion equipment to the maximum degree of available funds, but the pace lagged
behind other steelmakers, which confirmed its declining status in the steel
industry.
Besides its vulnerable financial situation, Fundidora had another weak-
ness—its higher degree of reliance on the government for markets and labor-
management negotiations. The dependence on the government was a double-
edged sword. On one hand, it was a reasonable corporate strategy in the
context of government procurements, access to public funds, and govern-
ment influence on labor unions. On the other hand, such a strategy was pre-
mised on favorable relations with the government, and if the government
changed its policy and took a hostile stance, the existence of the company
would be in danger.
In contrast to Fundidora, Hylsa was more autonomous from the govern-
ment for markets, funds for investment, and labor-management negotiations.
Moreover, Hylsa had a cooperative labor union, and Cuauhtémoc was its
main supporter.
In conclusion, three tasks were essential to the growth of private steel
producers in Mexico: (1) to expand production capacity in order to keep up
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with the rapidly growing steel market; (2) to ensure investment funds toward
that end; and (3) to maintain good relations with the government or to create
a corporate structure requiring less dependence on the government. A reduc-
tion in production costs and improvement in quality were not necessarily
requisites for the growth of steelmakers. Government policies only encour-
aged companies to expand their production capacity and lacked a mecha-
nism to reduce costs and upgrade quality. In this situation, private steel pro-
ducers made little effort to reduce costs and improve quality. High costs and
poor quality in the material sector determined costs and quality in the overall
process of industrialization, resulting in a lower competitive edge for indus-
try as a whole. The harmful effects were left unattended and became all the
more serious, and triggered a drastic change in industrial structure in the
1980s.
Note
1 From an interview at Hylsa in September 1995.
